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Abstract
I measure the impact of sex offenders on housing sales prices by
combining data from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry
with data on housing sales from December 2004 through
December 2008 in Mecklenburg County, NC. Using time-series
and cross-sectional analysis, I estimate that the arrival of a sex
offender into a neighborhood decreases housing sales prices within
0.1 of the miles of a sex offender by approximately 6%, while all
other nearby housing sales prices are unaffected. I then apply this
finding to examine sex offender residency restrictions passed in
North Carolina in 2006. I find that houses located within
neighborhoods where a sex offender can no longer reside
experience an increase in sales prices of roughly 2% as a result of
this law. This is consistent with related research and theoretical
models of housing prices.
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I. Introduction
Throughout the past two decades, a number of laws have been passed
which are designed to increase public awareness of sex offenders. Recently,
several states have also placed further limitations on sex offenders by establishing
residency restrictions, or zones where sex offenders are not allowed to reside.
North Carolina is an ideal state to study the impact of these laws, as there are
robust data sets available to the public that document sex offenders. In North
Carolina, all sex offenders either convicted or released from prison on or after
January 1, 1996 are registered in the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry that is
freely available online. Anyone who accesses this database can view the names
and residential addresses of all registered sex offenders in North Carolina, as well
as pictures and identifying information such as height, weight, scars and tattoos.
One interesting economic consequence of the public availability of sex
offenders’ locations is the influence on nearby housing prices. Leigh Linden and
Jonah Rockoff, two economists at Columbia University, have studied the effects
of sex offenders on nearby property values in Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina. This is the most populated county in North Carolina, and includes one
of the largest cities in the United States, Charlotte.1 Linden and Rockoff (2008)
conclude that when a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, the prices of
nearby homes drop significantly. Analyzing data on property sales from 1994
through 2004, they concluded that the average sale price of a house located within
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In 2011, the estimated population of Charlotte was 751,087, making it the 17th
largest city in the United States
(http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/3712000.html).
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0.1 miles of a sex offender drops by about 4 percent, or roughly $5,500.
Altogether, they estimate that property sales decreased by roughly $60 million in
Mecklenburg County alone.2
My research is divided into two parts. In the first half, I extend the
research conducted by Linden and Rockoff (2008). I use data on sex offenders
and single family home property sales in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina to
examine the effects of proximity to sex offenders on housing sale prices in the
two years following their data using difference-in-difference and standard
regression models. This new data yields similar results to those that Linden and
Rockoff (2008) found, confirming that close proximity to sex offenders has a
negative impact on housing sales prices. Using models similar to those employed
by Linden and Rockoff (2008), my research indicates that houses within 0.1 miles
of a sex offender’s residence decrease in value by approximately 6%, while
housing sales within 0.1 to 0.3 miles of a sex offender’s residence are not
impacted by the arrival of a sex offender. The second part of my research adapts
these models to analyze potential changes in housing sales prices caused by a
North Carolina General Statute that imposes residency restrictions on sex
offenders. Specifically, starting December 1, 2006, sex offenders are prohibited
from living within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center. My research
demonstrates that housing prices located within 1,000 feet of a school increase by
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Over the 10 year span that they studied, there were 373 sex offenders who
moved into homes in Mecklenburg County. The $60 million estimate was
determined by multiplying the number of houses within 0.1 miles of these sex
offenders by the average loss in property sale value due to the arrival of a sex
offender.
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approximately 2% due to the enforcement of residency restrictions on sex
offenders.
Both parts of my research help to explain the relationship between housing
sales and perceived crime risk within a neighborhood. Public perception of sex
offenders is that they are more likely to commit another crime, especially another
sexual offense. Studies have shown this to be true, and it is estimated that sex
offenders are 4 times more likely to be arrested for another sex crime when
compared to non-sex offender (Langan et al. 2003). This increase in sex crime
risk and the decrease in housing prices associated with a sex offender moving into
a neighborhood as demonstrated by my research helps to explain the relationship
between an increase in crime risk and the decrease in housing sales prices. This
hedonic pricing model of property sales can provide valuable information on the
relationship between proximity to sex offenders and property values. This
information on the relationship between the amount of money that homeowners
are willing to pay (or give up) to decrease the risk of crime can be used to further
enhance public policy relating to sex offenders as well as programs or services to
reduce the risk of crime.
II. Background
A. Institutional Setting
Sex offender registration laws have been in effect for almost two decades.
In 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Act required states to register sex offenders. Jacob
Wetterling was a young boy who was kidnapped while riding his bicycle home
from a store with some friends. Neither Jacob nor the kidnapper was ever found.
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This law was the start of a wave of legislation aimed to protect the public from
sex offenders. In 1996, this law was expanded to include public notification of the
residential address of sex offenders. While the exact requirements of this law vary
from state to state, most states provide information about sex offenders’ names,
residential locations and pictures to the public.
In 2005, the National Sex Offender Public Registry was established. This
is a website that contains links to sex offender registries from all states. The
following year, the registry was renamed the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender
Public Registry. Dru Sjodin was a college student at the University of North
Dakota when she was murdered by a registered sex offender. This registry
provides users with the ability to search for sex offenders by name, zip code, or
by inputting an address and viewing all sex offenders that live within a certain
radius.
North Carolina has one of the most informative sex offender registries of
any state. It provides a range of identifying characteristics of sex offenders
including pictures, names, height, weight, eye color and any other identifying
scars or marks. Also, the registry has detailed information of the date and
description of all crimes committed, as well as release dates and dates when sex
offenders have moved into their current address.
While registries have become one of the most prominent ways of tracking
and identifying sex offenders, there have been a number of other ways that states
have tried to prevent sex offenders from committing future crimes and to protect
neighborhoods, especially areas where children are present. As of 2006, more
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than 20 states have passed some form of residency restriction on sex offenders.
Typically, these laws prohibit sex offenders from living close to schools, parks,
day care centers, and other areas where children congregate. Depending on the
state, sex offenders cannot live within anywhere from 500 to 2,500 feet of one of
these facilities.
Starting on December 1, 2006, North Carolina enacted its own residency
restriction law for sex offenders. This law prevents a sex offender from living
within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center, and if caught, the offender may
be charged with a felony. There are two noticeable exceptions to this law. First,
the law grandfathers sex offenders living within close proximity to a school or
child care center before December 1, 2006 and allows them to continue to reside
at their current address. However, if they decide to move after December 1, they
will be subject to the residency restriction laws. Furthermore, this statute does not
prevent sex offenders from living near child care centers located within 1,000 feet
of an institute of higher education, as long as the sex offender is a student or is
currently employed at the institute.
These laws are highly controversial, as many advocates argue that they
have unintended consequences, such as severely limiting where a sex offender can
reside. Typically, sex offenders who have just been released from prison are faced
with the difficult task of finding affordable housing and advocates have argues
that residency restrictions further reduce the availability of affordable housing.
Consequently, advocates argue sex offenders either lie about their addresses or in
extreme cases become homeless.
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B. Related Literature
A number of economic papers have focused on the relationship between
crime risk and property values (Hellman and Naroff 1979; Lynch and Rasmussen
2001). Recently, economists have examined the relationship between the arrival
of a perceived high risk individual to a neighborhood (e.g. a sex offender) and the
effect on housing prices. While sex offenders are significantly more likely to
commit another sex crime (Langan et al. 2003), there has been no conclusive
evidence that sex offenders only target individuals near where they reside. In fact,
Agan (2011) finds that there is no ability to infer where sex crimes will be
committed based on sex offenders’ residential location. Together, this implies that
there is no real risk of being located in close proximity to a sex offender, and that
any decrease in property sales prices is caused by the perceived risk of living near
a sex offender.
In 2003, Larsen et al. looked at the relationship between property values
and nearby sex offenders by examining cross-sectional variation in data from
Montgomery County, Ohio. Linden and Rockoff (2008) improve upon this model
by using cross-sectional and inter-temporal data from Mecklenburg County to
analyze the impact of the arrival of a sex offender on housing prices. While
Larsen et al. (2003) estimated that houses sell for 17 percent less within 0.1 miles
of a sex offender, Linden and Rockoff (2008) estimated that the true change is
closer to 4%. They also examined their data using the framework of Larson et al.
(2003), and observed that the 4% change increased to just under 20%, which they
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attribute to Larson et al. (2003) not taking into account that sex offenders
systematically move into cheaper houses than the average individual.
Economists have also examined the effects of residency restrictions on sex
offenders. Adkins et al. (2000) , Durling (2006) , Levenson and Hern (2007), and
Kang (2012) have all looked at the consequences of residency restrictions, and
have found no significant decrease in recidivism caused by these laws. Residency
restrictions can also cause a severe decrease in available housing for sex
offenders. In cities such as San Francisco, residency restrictions eliminate
virtually all available housing for sex offenders (Lagos 2010). Furthermore,
studies on residency restrictions indicate that sex offenders encounter increasing
financial strain and have to live further away from public transportation access
points as well as work areas (Levenson 2008). The lack of effectiveness
associated with residency restrictions combined with the numerous unintended
consequences have caused these laws to be extremely controversial.
III. Methodology
A. Data
My empirical analysis relied on two sources of data. Data from June 2012
on sex offenders was obtained through the North Carolina Department of Justice.
This data includes the current address of all sex offenders as well as the date that
they registered at their address.3 By law, sex offenders are required to register
within three business days of release from a penal institution, and if a sex offender
3

This data contains information on 18,872 sex offenders who have registered
starting in December 1996. It is important to note that the data provides
information on the current address of sex offenders, so my analysis does not
consider sex offenders who frequently move residences.
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moves, the sex offender must provide written notification of the new address
within three business days. Because these laws are so strict, I can accurately judge
when a sex offender moves into a neighborhood.
The other source of information is Mecklenburg County data on housing
prices from December 2004 through December 2008. This information contains
the address, date and sale price of all single-family houses in Mecklenburg
County, as well as numerous identifying characteristics of each house, such as the
number of heated square feet, bedrooms and bathrooms and an overview of the
external condition of each house. Mecklenburg County also provided data on the
locations of all charter, private and public schools. I normalize the sales prices to
December 2006 dollars by using the Home Pricing Index for Charlotte, NC.
By combining these data sets, I am able to construct a data set that has the
characteristics of every single family house that was sold, the distance between
sex offenders and the houses that were sold and the dates of both the sex
offenders’ arrivals and the housing sales. For the second part of my analysis, I add
data on distances between housing sales and schools and child care centers to the
dataset.
It is important to note that this data only reflects houses that are sold in
Mecklenburg County, and therefore may not accurately represent the value of
houses more broadly. Changes in composition of either buyers or sellers caused
by the arrival of sex offenders to a neighborhood or the passing of the residency
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restriction law in 2006 may cause my estimates to be either positively or
negatively biased.4
B. Sample Summary
For the first part of my research, I look at all housing sales that occurred
between December 2004 and December 2006 that have a recorded sales price.
After eliminating all housing sales prices below $40,000 and above $1.165
million (the 1st and 99th percentile of housing sales prices), I am left with 20,588
housing sales. 752 of these sales occurred within 0.3 miles of a sex offender,
while 182 occurred within 0.1 miles of a sex offender. Table 1 provides a
summary of the main characteristics of housing sales by location. It is clear from
this information that sex offenders move to cheaper, smaller houses relative to all
housing sales in Mecklenburg County. This further reinforces the need to use
specific control groups in order to accurately measure the effects of sex offenders
on housing prices.
The second half of my research relies on housing sales from December
2004 to December 2008. Again, I include all housing sales except for those in the
1st and 99th percentile, which leaves 43,039 total sales. I also discard all housing
sales that occur near schools and child care centers that have a sex offender living
within 1,942 feet. If a school or child care center already has a sex offender living
within 1,000 feet, this law will have no effect on property values because the risk

4

It is possible that the arrival of a sex offender will cause people who are very
averse to crime risk to immediately try to sell their houses. In order to expedite
the sale, they may list their houses below the market value in order to attract a
buyer as quickly as possible, which would negatively impact the accuracy of my
estimates.
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of having a sex offender live in that neighborhood will not be eliminated.
Furthermore, since the treatment group does not have any neighborhoods with sex
offenders, I need to construct a control group that is of a similar nature. Finally, if
a sex offender lives just outside of the 1,4145 foot outer-radius of the control
group, the sex offender can still affect housing prices, so I eliminate schools and
child care centers where a sex offender lives within 5286 feet of the control group.
Out of 43,019 sales, 4,360 sales occurred within 1,000 feet of a school or child
care center and 3,923 sales occurred between 1,000 feet and 1,414 feet that fit the
previous specification. Major characteristics of the housing sales can be seen on
table 4. Unlike where sex offenders locate, houses that are close to schools tend to
have similar characteristics, on average, when compared to all houses sold in
Mecklenburg County. Even though these houses are very similar, we still want to
limit our control group to those houses just outside the treatment group in order to
eliminate other potential biases.
C. Empirical Model
There are a large number of factors that go into choosing where to buy a
house. Individuals must not only consider the characteristics of the house, such as
the overall quality, size and numbers of bedrooms and bathrooms, but they must
also consider the neighborhood. Moving close to a school can potentially benefit
an individual or family with young children, while moving into an area with high
taxes can be a detriment to home owners. Because of the multitude of highly
5

This radius was chosen so that the treatment and control groups have the same
number of square feet.
6
The first part of my research indicates that sex offenders influence housing
prices within 0.1 miles (528 feet) of his or her residence.

11
varying neighborhood in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, it is essential that
I do not solely rely on cross-sectional data in order to analyze the effects of sex
offenders on housing prices. As seen on table 1, sex offenders move to smaller
and cheaper houses. Therefore, it is essential that I look at very specific housing
sales in both treatment and control groups to accurately examine both the
influence of sex offenders on housing prices and the impact of residency
restrictions on sex offenders.
I limit my analysis to a treatment group of housing sales within 0.1 miles
of a sex offender and the control group to housing sales between 0.1 to 0.3 miles
of a sex offender. This ensures that I have an adequate amount of housing sales to
analyze while simultaneously only examining houses that are in close proximity
to one another.7 When examining the residency restrictions placed on sex
offenders, I look at houses within 1,000 feet of a sex offender compared to those
between 1,000 feet and 1,414 feet of a sex offender. While the 1,414 foot radius
seems significantly smaller than the 1,000 foot radius, the number of square feet
in both the control group and treatment group are the same. This provides a
suitable number of housing sales in both the treatment and control group while
still keeping the analysis free of bias, as houses in the treatment group are located
in close proximity to houses in the control group.
Before I examine the effects of sex offenders on nearby housing prices or
the change in housing prices caused by residency restrictions, I have to verify that

7

By having houses that are relatively close to one another, I can eliminate many
sources of bias, as the close proximity guarantees that the control and treatment
groups will be relatively homogenous.
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the treatment and control groups that I have described are similar to each other so
that the identification assumption holds in order for the difference-in-difference
estimates to be accurate. The identification assumption for the first part of my
research is that if a sex offender did not move into a neighborhood, there would
be no change in the difference in housing prices between the treatment and
control groups. I construct the following linear regression model to look at the
differences in major characteristics of housing sales in the treatment and control
groups. This model is:
(1)

I measure the log of the normalized sales price as a function of the distance from
the sex offender (or where the sex offender will live) to the housing sale, a
random error term, and a year specific term.

is a dummy variable that

equals 1 if the housing sale occurs within one-tenth of a mile of where a sex
offender is located or will locate and 0 otherwise. I also estimate all other major
characteristics of housing sales using a similar equation, but instead of using the
log of price as the dependent variable, I use other characteristics of housing sales.
These regressions provide information about the differences in key housing
characteristics in the treatment and control groups that I examine.
After I examine the differences between the treatment and control groups,
I compare housing sales located within 0.1 miles of where a sex offender will
locate to all other housing sales within the same year using the same regression
model as before:
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(2)

Then, I re-estimate the previous model with all housing sales characteristics as
well as neighborhood-year fixed effects added:
(3)

is a vector of housing characteristics and
neighborhood-year fixed effects term,

is a vector of coefficients.8 The

, controls for both changes in houses

prices caused by different neighborhoods, but also time trends across time in these
neighborhoods. Using these two equations, I can compare the coefficients on the
term to see how well the observable characteristics of housing sales can
predict the sales price.
Once I examine how well the observable characteristics of housing prices
determine the sales price of a house, I estimate two difference-in-difference
models. In the first model, I look at the treatment and control groups. The
regression model is as follows:
(4)

Where

is a dummy variable that indicates whether a housing sale occurred

before or after a sex offender arrived. In this model,

8

is the difference-in-

The housing characteristics that I use in my regression models are: number of
bedrooms, number of full bathrooms, number of half bathrooms, age of the house,
an indicator variable for whether or not the house was built in the year it was sold,
number of heated square feet and the overall quality of the exterior of the house.
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difference estimate of the change in housing prices caused by the arrival of a sex
offender.
Finally, I estimate the arrival of a sex offender by looking at all housing
sales in Mecklenburg County and adding additional terms to the previous
regression model.

is an indicator value that is 1 if a housing sale occurred

between 0.1 and 0.33 miles of a sex offender and 0 otherwise.
(5)
In this regression model I am interested in the difference-in-difference value,

.

I use the same estimation models to look at the impact of the residency
restrictions laws, with two major changes.

now is a dummy variable set to 1

if the housing sale occurred after December 1, 2006 and 0 otherwise, and the two
dummy variables

and

are replaced by

and

, respectively.

These variables are indicator variable that specify whether a property sale
occurred within 1000 feet of a school or between 1000 feet and 1414 feet of a
school. Finally, the identification assumption for the second half on my research
is that if this statute did not come into effect in December 2006, then the
difference in housing prices between the treatment and control groups before and
after December 2006 would be the same.
IV. Results
One of the main assumptions of the empirical model is that houses that
sell in the treatment and control groups have similar characteristics. While table 1
shows that the mean value of these housing characteristics is similar across both
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groups, I also estimate the differences in housing characteristics by using
variations of equation 1. I substitute the dependent variable with each of the major
characteristics of houses, and the results are shown on table 2. Very few of my
estimates of

are statistically different from 0 at the 95% confidence interval,

and of the variables that do change between the treatment and control groups, they
do not change significantly. In the case of the log of the year that the house was
built, while the coefficient is statistically different from 0, I estimate that its value
is 0.004, or that houses within 0.1 to 0.3 miles of a sex offender are just 0.4%
older than houses located within 0.1 miles of a sex offender. Also, while the
difference in the number of bedrooms and half bathrooms is statistically different
from 0, the number of bathrooms falls by 0.18 for houses located within 0.1 miles
of a sex offender while the number of half bathrooms rises by 0.12. Both of these
changes are extremely small, and therefore these results show that the control and
treatment groups have no major differences.
The other major assumption of the empirical model is that these housing
characteristics can accurately control for differences in housing prices. Estimating
equation 2, the value of

is -0.402, which can be seen on the first column of

table 3. This can be interpreted as houses located within 0.1 miles of a sex
offender before the offender arrive sells for roughly 40% less than those located
further away from where a sex offender will reside. In other words, houses
located near a sex offender are already significantly cheaper than the average
house sold in Mecklenburg County before a sex offender arrives. However, when
I estimate equation 3, which is the same as equation 2 except for the addition of
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housing characteristics as well as neighborhood-year fixed effects, the value of
changes to 0.0245, which is not statistically different from 0 at the 95%
confidence level. This data is located on the second column of table 3. This
implies that once we control for observable characteristics of housing sales, there
is no difference in price. This implies that the characteristics of housing sales that
are included in these regression models accurately control for observable features.
Once we have verified these two assumptions, I estimate equation 4. The
two key coefficients in this equation are

and

. I estimate that the value of

is -0.062, which is significantly different from 0 at the 95% confidence interval,
and

is 0.024, which is not statistically different than 0 at the 95% confidence

interval. These figures can be seen in the third column of table 3. The value of
implies that there is no difference in the value of a house between 0.1 and 0.3
miles and a house within 0.1 miles of a sex offender once all observable
characteristics are controlled for. Furthermore, the value of

, which is the

difference-in-difference estimator, implies that there is a significant non-zero
decrease in housing prices when a sex offender arrives in a neighborhood. While
the 6.2% decrease is statistically different from 0, it is not statistically different
from the estimated 4% decrease in housing prices within 0.1 miles of a sex
offender that Linden and Rockoff (2008) estimated.
I then expand my model to include all housing price sales and again
estimate the difference-in-difference regression model specified in equation 5.
The results can be seen in column 4 of table 3. The only coefficient that is
statistically different from 0 is the difference-in-difference estimator (

). Similar
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to the last model, this estimate is not statistically different than the estimate from
the previous model or from the estimate that Linden and Rockoff (2008) found.
Furthermore, the estimate of

indicates that the arrival of a sex offender has no

effect on houses that are between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of a sex offender. This implies
that the arrival of a sex offender only affects houses in the immediate vicinity
(within 528 feet) of where the sex offender is residing.9 In other words, the
decrease in housing sales prices cause by a sex offender is extremely localized.
Now that I have shown there is a significant decrease in housing sales
prices caused by sex offenders, I can examine the impact of the residency
restriction statute passed in 2006. I again rely on the key assumptions that houses
located within 1,000 feet of a school are similar to those located between 1,000
and 1,414 feet of a school and that these observable housing characteristics can
accurately control for the varying prices of housing sales.
While table 4 shows the mean values of all key characteristics, I also
estimate them using the same linear regression that I used for the first part of my
research on table 5. The results indicate that the control and treatment groups are
similar, however there are differences between the control and treatment groups.
The treatment group tends to have smaller, cheaper houses with slightly fewer
heated square feet, number of bedrooms and bathrooms. However, upon further
examination, these differences are very small. The difference between treatment
9

My research as well as other related work on this topic indicates that sex
offenders cause housing sales prices within 0.1 miles (528 feet) decrease
significantly while those between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of where a sex offender
resides do not decrease. However, this does not apply that a house located 527
feet from a sex offender will experience a drop in price by roughly 6% while a
house located 529 feet from a sex offender will not see a drop in price.
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and control group of 112 square feet is very small, especially since Linden and
Rockoff (2008) note in their paper that the average walk-in closet is about 80 feet.
While houses in the control group and treatment group vary in terms of number of
bedrooms and bathrooms, these again are very small. Furthermore, since the
treatment and control groups are located in extremely close proximity, it is very
unlikely that an event could occur that would change housing prices in just the
treatment or control groups. For this reason, as well as the next regression that I
construct, it seems that the identification assumption will hold.
My estimate of

in equation 2 is -0.133 (shown in the first column on

table 6), which is statistically different from 0. I then estimate equation 3, which
takes into account differential prices in houses caused by the neighborhood that
the house sells in as well as the key characteristics of a house. The results, shown
in column 2 of table 6, indicate that

is only 0.007, or that houses located close

to schools sell for only 0.7% more than other houses sold in Mecklenburg County.
This number is not statistically different from 0 at the 95% confidence interval.
This shows that the added variables as well as neighborhood-year effects explain
all of the difference between prices of housing sales located close to schools and
other housing sales in Mecklenburg County.
Now that I have verified the key assumptions that the regression models
rely on, I estimate the impact of the legislation through equation 4 , which is
shown in column 3 of table 6.The difference-in-difference estimator (

) is

positive, which implies that eliminating the possibility of a sex offender moving

19
into a neighborhood increases housing sales prices by approximately 1.4%. This
number is not statistically different from 0 at any reasonable confidence level.
The use of neighborhood-year fixed effects in this model helps to
eliminate changes in neighborhoods across time to give us a more accurate
estimate. However, one concern is that the fixed-effects terms are absorbing the
effect of the statute in this model. For that reason, I re-estimate the difference-indifference estimator using the same equation with just neighborhood fixed effects
(and still including housing characteristics). The result can be seen in column 4 of
table 6. Now, the difference-in-difference estimator is 0.021, which is statistically
different from 0 at the 95% confidence level. This model shows that there is a
causal relationship between the passing of the residency restriction laws and the
increase in housing prices. It must be noted that this regression model no longer
accounts for changes in neighborhoods over time. However, as we are only
observing housing prices within a 4 year window, these changes will have a
minimal effect on difference-in-difference estimate obtained from the regression
model.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
According to the results of related research and hedonic pricing models,
the perceived threat of crimes brought on by the arrival of a sex offender to a
neighborhood should decrease housing values while the elimination of the
possibility of an increase in crime risk caused by residency restriction laws should
increase housing values. By examining residential locations of sex offenders in
Mecklenburg County, NC and using both cross-sectional and time-series data, I
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am able to accurately examine the effects of perceived crime risk on housing sales
prices. My analysis relies on the assumption that differences in housing prices
rely on observable characteristics of houses, which is demonstrated by my
regression models. My findings support both of the conclusions suggested by
theoretical models. When a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, housing
sales prices within a localized area (up to 0.1 miles) decrease by approximately
6%, while all housing sales prices further away from the sex offender’s residence
are unaffected. I then use this finding to evaluate residency restrictions
implemented in North Carolina in December, 2006. I find that these restrictions
increase housing prices by approximately 2% in areas where a sex offender can
no longer live (and where there were no sex offenders previously residing). This
shows that the elimination of perceived crime risk posed by a sex offender
positively influences housing prices, while the perceived increase of crime risk
caused by a sex offender negatively influences housing prices.
My findings bring up several interesting related questions. While there is
an overall increase in housing prices caused by residency restrictions within
neighborhoods where a sex offender can no longer establish residency, there may
be varying effects depending on proximity to the boundary of this neighborhood.
Given a larger data set to work with, one could examine the increase in housing
prices as a function of distance from the boundary of the zone where sex
offenders can not live.
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Table 1: Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses Sold in
Mecklenburg County, 2004-2006
All
Sales

Sale Price
($100,000s)
Heated Sq. Ft.
(1,000s)
Bedrooms
Full Bathrooms
Half Bathrooms
Sample Size

Mean
(Std Err)
2.223
(0.011)
2.225
(0.007)
3.332
(0.006)
2.11
(0.004)
0.608
(0.004)
20530

Between 0.3 Miles
and 0.1 Miles

Within 0.1 Miles

Mean
(Std Err)
1.435
(0.031)
1.664
(0.027)
3.088
(0.027)
1.843
(0.021)
0.409
(0.021)
567

Mean
(Std Err)
1.354
(0.036)
1.67
(0.034)
2.978
(0.045)
1.845
(0.027)
0.448
(0.038)
181
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses within 0.3 Miles of a Sex
Offender, Sold in Mecklenburg County, 2004-2006

Differences in Sales Within
0.1 Miles of Offender
Constant
Sample Size
R2

Log Price
0.02
(0.047)
11.736
(0.023)*
364
0.0008

Log Year Built
0.004
(0.001)*
7.592
(0.0006)*
364
0.04

Heated Sq. Feet
(1000s)
-0.025
(0.075)
1.611
(0.037)*
364
0.006

Note: Only single family homes sold before the arrival of a sex offender.
* significant at 95% level.

Bedrooms
-0.183
(0.080)*
3.082
(0.039)*
364
0.016

Number of Full
Bathrooms
0.009
(0.059)
1.84
(0.029)*
364
0.001

Number of Half
Bathrooms
0.122
(0.061)*
0.38
(0.030)*
364
0.018
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Table 3: The Effect of a Sex Offender’s Close Proximity to a
Housing Sale
Log (Sale Price)
Pre-Arrival Within 0.1
Miles

Within .1 Miles of
Offender
Within .1 Miles PostArrival
Within 1/3 Miles of
Offender
Within 1/3 Miles PostArrival
Housing Char.
Year FE
Neighborhood- Year FE
Sample Size
R2
*significant at 95% level.

All Sales
-0.402
(0.060)*

Log (Sale Price)

Pre & Post-Arrival
Sales Within
All
0.3 Miles
Sales
All Sales
0.0245
0.024
-0.011
(0.025)
(0.021) (0.020)
-0.062
-0.068
(0.028)* (0.033)*
-0.019
(0.016)
-0.006
(0.021)
X

X

X

X

X

X

20437
0.9

748
0.9

20530
0.87

X

20437
0.003
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Table 4: Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses Sold in
Mecklenburg County, 2004-2008
All
Sales

Sale Price
($100,000s)
Heated Sq. Ft.
(1,000s)
Bedrooms
Full Bathrooms
Half Bathrooms
Sample Size

Mean
(Std Err)
2.125
(0.007)
2.17
(0.005)
3.291
(0.004)
2.081
(0.003)
0.594
(0.002)
43039

Between 1000 feet
and 1414 feet

Within 1000 feet

Mean
(Std Err)
2.133
(0.032)
1.993
(0.014)
3.199
(0.014)
1.955
(0.011)
0.526
(0.008)
3923

Mean
(Std Err)
1.94
(0.039)
1.901
(0.021)
3.109
(0.013)
1.903
(0.010)
0.489
(0.008)
4360
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses within 1414 feet of a School or
Child Care Center, Sold in Mecklenburg County, December 1, 2004 through December 1, 2006

Within 1000 ft. of School
or Child Care Center
Constant
Sample Size
R2

Log Price
-0.07
(0.018)*
12.059
(0.013)*
4305
0.007

Log Year Built
-0.0001
(0.0004)*
7.591
(0.0003)*
4305
0.0004

Heated Sq. Feet
(1000s)
-0.112
(0.025)*
2.014
(0.018)*
4305
0.006

Bedrooms
-0.06
(0.026)*
3.213
(0.019)*
4305
0.003

Note: Only single family homes sold before the residency restriction statute comes into effect.
* significant at 95% level.

Number of Full
Bathrooms
-0.045
(0.020)*
1.972
(0.015)*
4305
0.002

Number of Half
Bathrooms
-0.02
(0.016)
0.521
(0.012)*
4305
0.018
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Table 6: The Effect of Residency Restriction on Housing Sales
Prices
Log (Sale Price)
Pre-Residency
Restrictions

Within 1000 ft. of School
or Child Care Center
Within 1000 ft. PostResidency Restrictions
Housing Char.
Year FE
Neighborhood- Year FE
Neighborhood FE
Sample Size
R2

All Sales
-0.133
(0.012)*

Log (Sale Price)
Pre & Post-Residency
Restrictions
Sales Within
Sales Within
1414 feet
1414 feet
All Sales
0.007
-0.004
-0.008
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.007)
0.014
0.021
(0.011)
(0.010)*
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
21727
0.006

21727
0.87

8283
0.90

Note: Only housing sales in close proximity to schools that do not have a sex
offender residing close to the school (within 1942 feet).
*significant at 95% level.

8283
0.87
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Summary of Capstone Project
Throughout the past two decades, there have been a number of laws
designed to increase public awareness of sex offenders. In North Carolina, all sex
offenders either convicted or released from prison on or after January 1, 1996
have to register to a sex offender database that is freely available online. Anyone
who accesses the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry website has access to the
names and locations of all registered sex offenders, as well as pictures and
identifying information such as height, weight, scars and tattoos.
One interesting economic consequence of the public availability of sex
offenders’ locations is the influence on nearby housing prices. Leigh Linden and
Jonah Rockoff, two economists at Columbia University, have studied the effects
of sex offenders on nearby property values in Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina. This is the most populated county in North Carolina, and includes one
of the largest cities in the United States, Charlotte. Through their research, they
have concluded that when a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, the prices of
nearby homes drop significantly. Analyzing data on property sales from 1994
through 2004, they concluded that the average sale price of a house located within
0.1 miles of a sex offender drops by about 4 percent, or roughly $5,500.
Altogether, they estimate that property sales decreased by roughly $60 million in
Mecklenburg County alone. They then go on to estimate the cost to victims of
sexual offenses by combining the estimated loss of property sales with data on
crimes committed by sexual offenders.
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My research is divided into two parts. In the first half, I extend part of the
research conducted by Leigh Linden and Jonah Rockoff. I use data on sex
offenders and single family home property sales in Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina to examine the effects of sex offenders on housing sale prices in the two
years following their data. This new data yields similar results to those that
Linden and Rockoff achieved, confirming that sex offenders still have a negative
impact on housing sale prices. I then apply similar models to analyze possible
changes on housing sale prices caused by a North Carolina General Statute that
imposes residency restrictions on sex offenders. Specifically, starting December
1, 2006, sex offenders can no longer live within 1,000 feet of a school or child
care center. My research examines whether or not the elimination of the
possibility of having a sex offender move to a neighborhood influences the prices
of housing sales.
In order to successfully analyze the effect of sex offenders on housing sale
prices, I construct a treatment and control group of housing sales. Ideally, the
houses in both the treatment and control groups will be very similar in
characteristics. Before a sex offender arrives, the treatment and control groups
should be composed of houses that are approximately the same value and size,
and with other key characteristics such as number of bedrooms, bathrooms and
overall quality of the house that are roughly the same. Furthermore, I have to
ensure that the arrival of sex offenders does not impact the prices of housing sales
in the control group. I then conduct a difference-in-difference estimation, where I
compare the difference in housing sale prices between the treatment and control
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group before the sex offender arrives in a neighborhood with the difference in
housing prices after the sex offender arrives. This will give a rough estimate of
the impact of a sex offender on housing prices.
The best treatment group to use for this is the housing sales that lie closest
to where a sex offender will live. These sales will be impacted the most by the
arrival of a sex offender. Unfortunately, finding a suitable control group is slightly
harder. Looking at all property sales that do not occur close to where a sex
offender will live, these sales will not be impacted by the arrival of a sex offender.
However, these houses are systematically different from those houses located near
a sex offender. I show that, on average, sex offenders locate to smaller, cheaper
houses, so I cannot use all other housing sales as a suitable control group. Instead,
I examine housing sales that lie just slightly further away from a sex offender than
the treatment group. More specifically, my treatment group will be housing sales
that occur within 0.1 miles of a sex offender and my control group will be houses
that lie between 0.1 and 0.3 miles away from a sex offender. Since these houses
are located in such close proximity to each other, and oftentimes in the same
neighborhoods, they have very similar characteristics and are therefore suitable
treatment and control groups.
Now that I have suitable treatment and control groups, I go about
estimating the change in housing prices due to the arrival of sex offenders. In
order to offset the slight differences in the control and treatment groups, I
constructed a linear regression model. This model provides the same differencein-difference estimate as before; however, it adjusts the estimate of the change in
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housing sale prices caused by sex offenders in order to account for the slight
variations in housing characteristics between groups. Also, I correct for possible
changes in housing sale prices due to different neighborhoods. Since houses with
similar characteristics in different neighborhoods often do not sell at the same
price, I make sure to account for this variation.
After accounting for these differences in housing characteristics, I found
that houses selling within 0.1 miles of a sex offender sell for about 6% less than
those within 0.1 and 0.3 miles of a sex offender. I then go on to construct another
regression model in order to further justify these findings. Instead of looking at
only housing sales within 0.1 miles and 0.1 to 0.3 miles of a sex offender, I look
at all housing sales and take into account the distance from a house to a sex
offender. This regression model gives an estimated decline of housing sales
within 0.1 miles of a sex offender of 6.8%. The closeness of these two estimates
to each other further strengthens my estimates, and leads me to conclude that sex
offenders have a profound negative impact on property sales.
Now that I have shown that sex offenders negatively impact property sales
that take place in their immediate vicinity, I use the same framework to analyze
the impact of a North Carolina General Statute on housing prices. This statute,
which took effect on December 1, 2006, prohibited registered sex offenders from
living within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center. However, if a sex
offender was previously living with 1,000 feet of a school or child care center, he
or she could remain there.
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My analysis focuses on schools in Mecklenburg County, NC. I construct
treatment and control groups in the same way as Linden and Rockoff did in their
research. The treatment group is housing sales within 1,000 feet of a school, and
the control group is housing sales between 1,000 and 1,414 feet of a school.
While the 1,414 foot radius seems significantly smaller than the 1,000 foot radius,
the number of square feet in both the control group and treatment group are the
same. After examining these two groups, they are remarkably similar. There is no
major difference between price, size, or any other characteristics of these homes.
Also, the homes within 1,000 feet of a school will be impacted by this law, while
those outside will not. Again, I construct a linear regression model in order to
account for the small amount of variation between the characteristics of the
treatment and control groups as well as the different neighborhoods where these
houses are located. After running this regression model, the result is that there is a
2% increase in housing prices within 1,000 feet of a school due to the enactment
of this statute.
Together, these two parts of my research help understand both the change
in housing sale prices caused by having a sex offender move into a neighborhood
and the change in housing sale prices caused by the elimination of the possibility
that a sex offender will move into a neighborhood. The first part of my research is
essential to verify that sex offenders have a negative impact on housing prices
within 0.1 miles of their residence. Once I establish this, I examine how a
neighborhood reacts when the possibility of a sex offender arriving was
eliminated through the North Carolina General Statute. I am able to prove that
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there is a causal relationship between the passage of this statute and changes in
housing sale prices within 1,000 feet of a school, which implies that this statute
helps to offset the damages to housing sale prices caused by sex offenders. Even
though related research has shown that this statute has had numerous negative
consequences, such as failing to reduce recidivism among sex offenders, it does
positively impact housing sales prices.

